Case study · Thane Rural Police
EMTS.
Every item has an identity. Every handover leaves a record.
The Evidence Management & Tracking System, developed for Thane Rural Police. Items are registered once, tagged with QR labels, and followed through every transfer under role-based access with a complete audit trail. Blockchain-based verification supports record integrity.
- Client
- Thane Rural Police
- Sector
- Public safety
- Status
- Developed for Thane Rural Police
- Roles modelled
- 4
01 · Context
Physical evidence has to remain demonstrably untouched and accounted for from seizure to court. EMTS (referred to as MMTS in earlier project material) was developed for Thane Rural Police to give every evidence item a traceable identity and a recorded custody history.
02 · The challenge
Custody has to be provable
The value of evidence depends on being able to show who held it, when and why. Gaps in that story weaken it.
Records made after the fact
When logging happens later, in a register or a spreadsheet, the record is only as reliable as someone’s memory.
Access must match responsibility
Not everyone should be able to see or change every item. Access needs to follow role and station.
History must resist alteration
A custody log is only useful if there is confidence it has not been edited.
03 · The approach
- 1
Identity at registration
Every item is registered once and tagged with a QR label that follows it.
- 2
Record at the moment of action
QR workflows mean handovers are captured when they happen, not reconstructed later.
- 3
Permissions by role and station
Role-based access limits who can act on which items.
- 4
Audit trail and verification
Actions are logged, and blockchain-based verification supports confidence in the integrity of records.
04 · The system
Why a custody record resists alteration
Linked, verified records make quiet edits visible. Try recording a handover, then altering history.
Record 1
Item registered · QR label attached
prev 00000000
hash a81169f4
Record 2
Handed over: registering officer → custodian
prev a81169f4
hash de189a4a
Record 3
Moved to storage location
prev de189a4a
hash c3414f02
Illustration · A conceptual demonstration of why linked, hash-verified records expose alteration. It is not the production algorithm and uses no real records.
System architecture
Registered identity
Evidence is registered once and tagged with a unique QR label.
QR-driven workflows
Scanning drives lookups and handovers so records are created at the moment of action, not afterwards.
Custody history
Every transfer between people and locations is captured against the item.
Role-based access
What a user can see or change depends on role and station.
Audit trail
Actions are logged so custody history can be reviewed end to end.
Blockchain-based verification
Blockchain-based verification supports confidence that records have not been altered.
05 · Workflow
Register. Item receives a unique identity and QR label.
06 · What it provides
A traceable identity per item
Each piece of evidence is individually identifiable by QR label.
A recorded custody history
Handovers are captured against the item, in order.
Controlled access
Roles and stations govern what each user can do.
Reviewable accountability
An audit trail allows custody and activity to be examined end to end.
We describe what the system provides rather than quoting performance numbers. Measured results will be published here once verified.
07 · What we don’t show
EMTS operates in a sensitive environment. Screens, data, deployment details and case information are intentionally not shown. The diagram on this page is generic and uses no real records.
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